List Voting’s Travels: The Importance Of Being Independent In The Boardroom by Passador, Maria Lucia
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 24, Number 1 2019 Article 4
List Voting’s Travels: The Importance Of
Being Independent In The Boardroom
Maria Lucia Passador∗
∗Research Fellow of Bocconi University in Milan, Italy and Visiting Researcher of Columbia
Law School in New York City, New York
Copyright c©2019 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
List Voting’s Travels: The Importance Of
Being Independent In The Boardroom
Maria Lucia Passador
Abstract
The life of the law, especially with regard to corporations, is strongly influenced by experience
and practice. The board, a living element of corporate law, is therefore one of the most noteworthy
aspects to be studied, given its relevant implications and role as the lifeblood of scholarly debates.
This Article offers a novel contribution to the assessment of list voting, a fairly unique Italian
system that has been increasingly appreciated by institutional investors. A hand-picked dataset
that stretches from 2005 to 2015 shows a positive correlation between minority-appointed direc-
tors in the boardroom and dividend payouts. Furthermore, the findings shed light on the practice
of appointing independent directors based on slates proposed by the minority of shareholders
and provide evidence that list voting works, not only in closely-held corporations, but also on
a global scale, despite the previous scholarship that argues that list voting makes more sense in
concentrated ownership scenarios. Although the empirical analysis focuses on the Italian case,
the insight gained in this analysis regarding the effectiveness of list voting is also useful for other
jurisdictions.
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ABSTRACT 
The life of the law, especially with regard to corporations, is strongly 
influenced by experience and practice. The board, a living element of 
corporate law, is therefore one of the most noteworthy aspects to be 
studied, given its relevant implications and role as the lifeblood of 
scholarly debates. 
This Article offers a novel contribution to the assessment of list 
voting, a fairly unique Italian system that has been increasingly 
appreciated by institutional investors. A hand-picked dataset that 
stretches from 2005 to 2015 shows a positive correlation between 
minority-appointed directors in the boardroom and dividend payouts. 
Furthermore, the findings shed light on the practice of appointing 
independent directors based on slates proposed by the minority of 
shareholders and provide evidence that list voting works, not only in 
closely-held corporations, but also on a global scale, despite the 
previous scholarship that argues that list voting makes more sense in 
concentrated ownership scenarios. Although the empirical analysis 
focuses on the Italian case, the insight gained in this analysis regarding 
the effectiveness of list voting is also useful for other jurisdictions. 
   
                                                                                                                                         
* Research Fellow, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy; Visiting Researcher, Columbia Law 
School, New York City (NY), United States. I am grateful to my supervisors, professors 
Piergaetano Marchetti, Mark J. Roe, and Jeffrey N. Gordon. I would like to thank also 
professors Jesse M. Fried, Matteo Gatti, Martin Gelter, Sean J. Griffith, Gianfranco 
Siciliano, two anonymous reviewers appointed by the Society of Empirical Legal Studies 
(SELS), as well as the participants at the Harvard Empirical Legal Studies Series 2017, 
at the 12th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, held at Cornell Law School 
(Ithaca, New York) in October 2017, and at the American Society of Comparative Law–
Workshop on Comparative Business and Financial Law, held at Fordham Law School 
(New York City) in February 2018 for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
106 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 106 
I. LIST VOTING IN ITALY ............................................................. 109 
A. The Role of Independent Directors ................................. 109 
B. Role of Directors Appointed by 
 Minority Shareholders in the Boardroom ...................... 111 
C. Impact of Institutional Investors in the 
 Appointment of Directors: The Italian Case .................. 112 
D. List Voting Technique: The Italian Case ........................ 114 
1. Slates Presentation and Connection 
 Among the Lists ....................................................... 115 
2. Impacts of the Record Date ........................................ 117 
II. LIST VOTING IN A COMPARATIVE 
 PERSPECTIVE: AN OVERVIEW ............................................. 119 
III. LIST VOTING AND DIVIDEND 
 POLICIES: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ....................................... 129 
A. Overview of the Issues .................................................... 129 
B. Overview of the Literature .............................................. 131 
C. Dataset: Sample Construction ......................................... 133 
D. Research Questions and Hypotheses ............................... 135 
E. Methodology .................................................................... 136 
F. List Voting’s Empirical Lesson ....................................... 146 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 147 
APPENDIX ..................................................................................... 150 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Board composition is the issue for investors in 2017.”1 This Article 
addresses the crucial interests linked to a sound appointment process of 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Paula Loop, A Look at Board Composition: How Does Your Industry Stack Up?, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 6, 2017) (emphasis added), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/06/a-look-at-board-composition-how-does-
your-industry-stack-up [https://perma.cc/7MK5-JV6V]. For overviews on board matters 
and concerns, see Martin Lipton & Sabastian V. Niles, The Spotlight on Boards 2017, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2017), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/29/the-spotlight-on-boards-2017-2 
[https://perma.cc/V2VF-SA3G]; Stephen F. Arcano & Thomas H. Kennedy, Directors 
Must Navigate Challenges of Shareholder-Centric Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 22, 2017), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/22/ 
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key figures in corporate boards, with a special focus on independent 
directors. These independent directors are predominantly devoted to the 
supervision of a thoughtful long-term strategy and the needs of 
institutional investors.2 This Article aims to enrich the existing literature 
with an in-depth analysis of the list (or slate) voting mechanism, one of 
the most well-known and appreciated peculiarities in the Italian corporate 
law framework.3 
As is often the case in the field of business law, an analysis of a 
mechanism’s function plays a crucial role in the supporting legal 
discussion. 4  This Article advances relevant literature by providing 
evidence that independent directors selected from lists presented by 
minority shareholders are quite effective in improving the governance of 
listed corporations. 
To demonstrate that list voting represents an effective instrument of 
governance, this Article combines legal and empirical observations, 
                                                                                                                                         
directors-must-navigate-challenges-of-shareholder-centric-paradigm [https://perma.cc/ 
5LUU-VXW4]. 
 2. The average share capital possessed by institutional investors did not notably 
differ from previous years (2013 & 2014), as stated in the latest report issued by the 
Commissione Nazionale Per Le Società E La Borsa (CONSOB), which is an organization 
akin to an “Italian SEC.” Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, Report on 
Corporate Governance of Italian Listed Companies, 3, 11-13 (2017) [hereinafter 
CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance]. 
 3. List voting is a method in which shareholders of listed corporations reaching a 
minimum threshold of shares, which is calculated based on the capitalization of the issuer 
(often around 1.5%), present a “list” for the election of the board. Directors from the list 
receiving the greatest number of votes are elected, but a minimum number of directors 
(generally one) are taken from the list receiving the second highest number of votes, 
ensuring greater representation of minority shareholders. Lists are presented by both 
majority and minority shareholders (owning at least 2% of shares), but the terms 
“majority list(s)” or “minority list(s)” are used as a result of the appointment process, 
and not because of the fact that the lists are presented by majority or minority 
shareholders. See generally Marco Ventoruzzo et al., Italian Boards and The Strange 
Case of the Minority Becoming Majority, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & 
FIN. REG. (May 23, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/23/italian-boards-
and-the-strange-case-of-the-minority-becoming-majority/ [https://perma.cc/3Z7U-XF 
D2]. 
 4. See id. at 4-5. The interpretations provided in this Article pertain exclusively to 
listed companies, which are required to use list voting for the appointment of directors 
and must be limited to them; however, all companies may use this method to ensure 
effective protection of minority shareholders. 
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arguing that Enhanced-Independence Directors (EI Directors) are truly 
necessary. 5  From a methodological perspective, this Article offers a 
preliminary and essential description of list voting, while also undertaking 
a comparative assessment and evaluating the propensity of independent, 
and minority-appointed, directors to pay dividends. 6  In light of the 
literature, which suggests that independent directors are more concerned 
with the board’s monitoring activity and that dividends in corporate 
governance aim to mitigate the free cash flow issue, boards with a 
significant number of minority-appointed directors are more likely to use 
dividend payouts as a corporate governance tool.7 
Part I of this Article examines list voting and its main issues. Part II 
depicts the comparative scenario, providing the reader with an overview 
of the alternatives worldwide, contemplating similarities and differences 
that shareholders have at their disposal to appoint valuable directors. Part 
III presents the empirical analysis performed to evaluate whether the 
Italian list voting technique can succeed at an international level. 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1275, 1277 (2017). See generally Giovanni 
Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors’ Independence at Controlled Companies, J. CORP. 
LAW (forthcoming) (discussing regulatory strategies that can be used to mitigate the 
distorting effects of the relational dimension of the board and to induce EI directors to 
undertake their supervisory functions in an independent way despite the presence of a 
controlling shareholder). 
 6. Brian R. Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation 
of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273, 1306-
08 (2006). 
 7. “[T]he main role for such boards is to mediate between shareholders with 
conflicting preferences for dividends” and to “reconcile fundamental differences in 
owners’ preferences and/or act as a referee when owners disagree on corporate policies, 
most notably on the dividend policies.” Mike Burkart, Salvatore Miglietta & Charlotte 
Ostergaard, Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law, 
4, 6–7 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No. 504, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2902617 [https://perma.cc/U4NW-
2HP5]. 
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I. LIST VOTING IN ITALY 
A. THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
The United States began using the term “independent directors” in 
the 1970s.8 The primary function of independent directors in the United 
States “has been clear: to monitor management on behalf of dispersed 
shareholders, who are hindered by collective action problems from 
monitoring management themselves.”9 Also, it is “uncontroversial” that 
they “were not (and are not) primarily designed to be a mechanism for 
monitoring controlling shareholders . . . becom[ing] functionally 
redundant in companies with a controlling shareholder.”10 Such a concept 
of “independence from managers” is not necessarily applicable 
elsewhere, since, in many leading economies, independent directors are 
designed to be “independent from the company’s management and 
significant shareholders.”11 
In 2011, the Italian Corporate Governance Code also introduced 
independent directors.12 The Code did not limit their role to the subtler 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the U.S., 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2007). 
 9. Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim, Varieties of Independent Directors in Asia: 
A Taxonomy, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 89, 97 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds., 
2017). 
 10. Id. at 98. 
 11. Id. at 102; see also Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Songlian Tang & 
Pengcheng Zhu, Inside the “Black Box” of Private In-House Meetings, 23 REV. ACCT. 
STUD. 487 (2018) (emphasizing the association between the independence of the board 
and (1) the frequency of meetings, which suggests better communication with major 
external investors; (2) the promptness of public communications; and (3) the relatively 
small market response to such meetings, conveying that more independent boards could 
discourage managers from sharing price-sensitive information). A further association can 
be found between the independence of the board and the reduction of insider trading and 
its profitability in private meetings and, in general, among listed companies. 
 12. Codice di Autodisciplina [Corporate Governance Code] Luglio 2015, art. 2, Jul. 
2015 (It.). See Lucia Calvosa, Alcune Riflessioni Sulla Figura Degli Amministratori 
Indipendenti, in IL TESTO UNICO DELLA FINANZA. UN BILANCIO DOPO 15 ANNI 45, 45–56 
(Filippo Annunziata ed. 2015) (It.); Maria Luisa Di Battista, Andrea Lippi & Paola 
Schwizer, Independent Directors and Governance Ratings: Evidence from Italian Listed 
Companies, in RESHAPING COMMERCIAL BANKING IN ITALY: NEW CHALLENGES FROM 
LENDING TO GOVERNANCE 241 (2014); Francesco Chiappetta, Gli amministratori 
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U.S. meaning, 13  rather it fully recognizes that independent directors 
express the opinions, albeit subjective, of minority shareholders. Thus, 
the Italian recognition of independent directors has contributed to a 
constant and profitable dialogue, creating a correct, transparent, and 
efficient governance.14 
                                                                                                                                         
indipendenti e gli amministratori di minoranza, 4 RIV. DIR. SOC. 852, 857-58 (2009) (It.); 
Paolo Ferro-Luzzi, Indipendente . . . Da Chi; Da Cosa?, RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ [RIV. 
SOC.] 204 (2008) (It.); Francesco Denozza, L’ ‘Amministratore di Minoranza’ e i suoi 
Critici, 31 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE [GIUR. COMM.] 767, 767 (2005) (It.); María 
Gutiérrez & Maribel Sáez, Deconstructing Independent Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 
63, 93 (2013) (“We think of the independents as a mechanism that would facilitate the 
effective exercise of many of the ‘rights of the minority’ granted by corporate law that 
are not enforced because of collective action problems. Therefore, they would use their 
privileged information to act as surrogates for the minority in all the matters where the 
role of the minority is already recognised by the law, such as information rights, voting 
in cases of conflicts of interest and the bringing about of lawsuits against the board.”); 
Andrea Pisani Massamormile, Appunti sugli Amministratori Indipendenti 2 RIVISTA DI 
DIRITTO SOCIETARIO [RIV. DIR. SOC.] 237, 241-42 (2008) (It.); Duccio Regoli, Gli 
Amministratori Indipendenti, in 2 IL NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETÀ, LIBER AMICORUM 
GIAN FRANCO CAMPOBASSO 385, 385-97 (P. Abbadessa & G.B. Portale eds., 2006) (It.); 
Umberto Tombari, Amministratori Indipendenti, “Sistema dei Controlli” e Corporate 
Governance: Quale Futuro?, 65 BANCA BORSA 506, 506-07 (2012) (It.). See generally 
Massimo Belcredi & Lorenzo Caprio, Amministratori indipendenti e amministratori di 
minoranza: stato dell’arte e proposte evolutive, in ATTI DEI SEMINARI CELEBRATIVI PER 
I 40 ANNI DALL’ISTITUZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA 
BORSA 19 (G. Mollo ed., 2015) (It.); Guido Ferrarini & Marilena Filippelli, Independent 
Directors and Controlling Shareholders Around the World (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. 
Working Paper Series in L., Paper No. 258, 2014) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2443786 [https://perma.cc/N5QY-VR53]; Guido Ferrarini, Funzione 
del Consiglio di Amministrazione, Ruolo Degli Indipendenti e Doveri Fiduciari, in I 
CONTROLLI SOCIETARI-MOLTE REGOLE, NESSUN SISTEMA 51 (Margherita Bianchini & 
Carmine Di Noia eds., 2010) (It.); Umberto Tombari, Verso uno “Statuto Speciale” degli 
Amministratori Indipendenti. (Prime Considerazioni sul d.lgs. n. 303/2006 e sulle 
Modifiche al Regolamento Consob in Materia di Emittenti), 3 RIV. DIR. SOC. 51 (2007) 
(It.). 
 13. Puchniak & Kim, supra note 9, at 97. (“[A] monolithic label obscures the reality 
that jurisdictional differences in the form and function of ‘independent directors’ . . . may 
be significant”). 
 14. Id. at 98-99. The two figures differ significantly in terms of function and 
structure. While independent directors are needed in the boardroom, there is no rule 
requiring the presence of minority-appointed directors, in particular if: (1) no slate of 
candidates has been filed, and (2) the requirements contained in the bylaws or in the law 
have not been met. 
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It does not necessarily follow, however, that there is a clash between 
directors with different ideologies,15 creating strong tension. In fact, list 
voting sometimes promotes effective monitoring and highly critical 
assessment of directors’ behavior.16 
B. ROLE OF DIRECTORS APPOINTED BY MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE 
BOARDROOM 
It is clear that the free, unregulated, but nevertheless effective, 
balance among corporate interests is not conducive to the protection of 
minority shareholders. 17  Accordingly, the U.K. regulatory authority 
required that the election or re-election of independent directors would 
need a majority of both shareholders and independent shareholders of the 
listed company.18 The Italian regulation introduced list voting,19 in which 
the minority list can determine the election of at least one director (out of 
seven, or at least two directors if more than seven directors are on the 
                                                                                                                                         
 15. Denozza, supra note 12, at 769. 
 16. Id. In large listed corporations, the role of the board is predominantly to monitor, 
approve the overall corporate strategy, ensure that officers and managers effectively and 
loyally pursue the best interest of investors, but do not manage day-to-day operation. Id. 
Thus, directors representing shareholders (especially minority ones) strengthen their 
monitoring function and critics related to managerial aspects. 
 17. Defining the concept of minority, a priori, is not easy. Only after voting, slates 
may be identified as “minority lists” or not, which can lead to paradoxical results, as some 
Italian cases may suggest. See Alberto Mazzoni, Le Minoranze nella Tipologia della 
Realtà, in LA TUTELA DELLE MINORANZE NELLE SOCIETÀ QUOTATE. STUDI IN MEMORIA 
DI ALESSANDRO CERRAI 13, 16 (Antonio Piras ed., 2004) (It.); C. Angelici, La tutela delle 
minoranze, 18 SOCIETÀ 786, 787 (1999) (It.); Paolo Montalenti, Corporate Governance: 
La Tutela delle Minoranze nella Riforma delle Società Quotate, 25 GIUR. COMM. 329 
(1998) (It.); Niccolò Salanitro, La Tutela delle Minoranze nelle Assemblee delle Società 
Quotate 62 BANCA BORSA 681, 682 (1999) (It.). See also Marco Ventoruzzo et al., Italian 
Boards and the Strange Case of the Minority Becoming Majority, HARVARD L. SCH. 
FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (May 23, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2016/05/23/italian-boards-and-the-strange-case-of-the-minority-becoming-majority/ 
[https://perma.cc/3Z7U-XFD2]. 
 18. FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, § 9.2.2.E (R) (UK). 
 19. It should be noted that list voting first appeared in the context of non-listed 
corporations as a political choice given the low access threshold required to present such 
minority lists. Already recognized a decade ago, the system is now increasingly relevant 
since the number of institutional investors is rapidly growing. See Codice civile [C.C.] 
[Civil Code] art. 2368 (It.); Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58 G.U. July 12, 
2011 n.120 at art. 148 (It.). 
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board)20 among the candidates not mentioned on the majority list.21 This 
ensures a more balanced structure of the board, especially in cases of 
concentrated ownership. But, even before that, the possibility of deviating 
from the majority rule through list voting was derived from the Italian 
Civil Code, which enables the bylaws to regulate the appointment of 
directors.22 
C. IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE APPOINTMENT OF 
DIRECTORS: THE ITALIAN CASE 
The problem of controlling the influx of private benefits is 
remarkable, especially in Italy, a country characterized by a stable control 
of the majority group, family ties, and shareholders’ agreements. The 
provisions of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance (TUF) must, 
therefore, necessarily aim to balance minority rights against the almost 
non-contestability of listed Italian issuers that hinder the creation of an 
ideal market for corporate control.23 It is essential to make the company 
attractive to foreign investors as well, since their presence leads to 
economic and financial development. The perception of a well-
functioning system is often deemed useful to encourage overall 
investments. Therefore, the impression of efficiency becomes essential to 
the final decisions of investors. In other words, appropriate governance 
functions as a signal to institutional investors, which enhances confidence 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1292 (explaining that 
“a recent amendment provided public investors with the power to reelect an external 
director” even if there are any objections). For a comparison, see the following for Israel’s 
approach. Companies Law, 5759-1999, § 239 (1999-2000) (Isr.); see also Itai 
Fiegenbaum & Amir N. Licht, Corporate Law of Israel 7–8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., 
L. Working Paper Series No. 372, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3050329 [https://perma.cc/A9FM-RRSR] (requiring public companies to 
have at least two external directors—not related to the controlling shareholder—on their 
boards, elected for a term of three years, and possibly re-elected for two additional terms 
of office of the same duration). Public investors have the right to veto the appointment of 
such directors, but are not allowed to nominate them. See Assaf Hamdani & Yishay 
Yafeh, Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691, 701 (2013). 
 21. Mario Notari & Mario S. Richter Jr., Adeguamenti Statutari e Voto a Scrutinio 
Segreto nella legge sul Risparmio, 5 SOCIETÀ 533, 533-34 (2006) (It.). 
 22. Codice civile [C.C.] [Civil Code] art. 2368 (It.). 
 23. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998) (It.). TUF is the fundamental law governing the financial 
markets in Italy. 
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in the valuation of investments, and consequently serves as a reference 
for shareholders with few shares, while simultaneously attracting new 
investors.24 
List voting is an essential factor for shareholder activism, as well as 
for financial and institutional partners and hedge funds.25 Assogestioni, a 
voluntary non-profit association of asset management companies created 
in 1984, promotes activist initiatives, including list voting, through means 
such as assisting institutional investors complete certain administrative 
procedures (e.g. the submission of lists and the selection of candidates).26 
All this is not sufficient, however, to address the marked weakness of the 
phenomenon that afflicts the geographical environment. Most asset 
management companies are relatively inactive, as they have strong links 
to funds, such as Azimut, Ersel, Fondaco Franklin Templeton 
Investments, and Kairos Partners, each of which plays a key role when 
they are independent. 27  Nonetheless, asset management companies’ 
activities are growing over time, 28  mainly as a result of the 
implementation of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive (as amended in 
2017, also known as SHRD II). 
Foreign institutional investors, who prefer to sit on the sidelines, may 
occasionally rely on the boards to submit the list(s), facilitating their 
participation in the governance of the listed companies in which they 
commit capital. 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Constraints on Large-Block 
Shareholders, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 139, 144-55 (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2000). 
 25. Although hedge funds are not particularly active in the Italian market, partially 
due to the presence of concentrated shareholding and the strong role of family businesses, 
their existence is confirmed by Algebris Investments in Assicurazioni Generali, Amber 
in Banca Popolare di Milano, and Centaurus in Marzotto. See Matteo Erede, Governing 
Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: an Empirical Analysis of Hedge 
Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and its Evolution, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 
328, 363-66 (2013). In spite of the tools that the regulator offers them, and through the 
appointment of directors, hedge funds did not gain any relevant role. Id. at 368-70. 
 26. Interview with Marcello Messori, Former President, Assogestioni,  L’attivismo 
dei Gestori e il Ruolo della Corporate Governance in Italia (2017), http://www. 
assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,147,5305/messori_governance_0609.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
F35A-LE94]. 
 27. Erede, supra note 25, at 383-88. 
 28. Id. at 375. 
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D. LIST VOTING TECHNIQUE: THE ITALIAN CASE 
List voting is consistent with the already existing requirements with 
which directors must comply, influencing their ability to make up their 
minds, as well as strengthening integrity, ethics, loyalty, education, and 
experience.29 Once a certain threshold of share capital has been reached, 
the lists would contribute to the appointment of the board, which would 
represent either the majority or the minority of shareholders. Bylaws can 
then meet the needs of their own shareholders. 
Developing an effective list voting system can be accomplished in 
two ways: (1) through a procedure that grants a certain percentage of the 
board to minority shareholders, or (2) through ratios and percentages on 
the votes obtained by each list. Then, votes must be divided by the number 
of directors to be elected, with each director assigned a quotient according 
to the expected order on the list and, in the event of a tie, preferring the 
candidates appearing on the list that received the majority of votes or, in 
their absence, favoring the eldest ones. 
The list voting system was introduced to protect minorities, 
encourage their participation,30 avoid the presentation of empty or non-
representative lists, and elect a suitably balanced board. These goals were 
the objectives of the 2005 Savings Law, implemented by the SHRD II 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. On November 14, 2016, the European Central Bank launched a public 
consultation on the development of the guidelines that will regulate the verification of 
directors’ eligibility under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD IV) suggested to verify these requirements considering conflicts of 
interest, independent judgments and time constraints. The banking sector is proving to be 
an area in which regulation is advancing at a particularly fast pace. On the one hand, the 
board members must be people of true integrity and ensure a sound and prudent 
management. Council 2013/36, art. 91, 2013 O.J. (L 176) (EU). On the other hand, they 
must act with independence of judgment, assessing, in the absence of interest, that the 
conflict is not in itself a sign that the representative must act with the necessary 
independence of judgment. Id. In the event that the board is composed of the exponents 
of the main monitoring functions (e.g. risk management and compliance), the newly 
appointed directors responsible for overseeing these tasks will be assessed as board 
members while, in other cases, the guidance will also apply to those who hold important 
positions to the extent permitted by national legislation. Id. 
 30. Corrado Malberti & Emiliano Sironi, L’Adeguamento delle Società Quotate alla 
Procedura di Nomina del Consiglio di Amministrazione mediante Voto di Lista: 
Un’Analisi Empirica, 53 RIV. SOC. 724, 726 & n.3 (2008) (It.). 
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that introduced “gender quotas”31 and bolstered by the codes of corporate 
governance.32 
1. Slates Presentation and Connection Among the Lists 
The right to present a list may be correctly considered intimately 
linked to the voting right in the shareholders general meeting (GM),33 
depriving shareholders of their legitimate—and, indeed, existing—
interest is not immune to consequences. Shareholder-investors have 
strong reasons for, and interest in, influencing profitability issues. 
The “Italian SEC” has been asked to regulate how lists are presented 
and voted on, as well as the cases in which there are connections between 
them. 34  This has resulted in a series of hypotheses in which the 
phenomenon occurs. 
                                                                                                                                         
 31. See M. Bianco, A. Ciaverella & R. Signoretti, Women on Boards in Italy 9 (Oct. 
2011) http://www.consob.it/documents/11973/204072/qdf70.pdf/92de8d75-ea5b-4d0e-
aeac-6b91ef866ebc [https://perma.cc/36SD-J35C]. See generally Lucia Calvosa & 
Serenella Rossi, Gli Equilibri di Genere Negli Organi di Amministrazione e Controllo 
delle Imprese, OSSERVATORIO DEL DIRITTO CIVILE & COMMERCIALE [OSS. DIR. CIV. & 
COMM.] 3 (2013) (It.); Massimo R. De Ritis, L’Introduzione delle c.d. Quote Rosa negli 
Organi di Amministrazione e Controllo di Società Quotate, 35 LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI 
COMMENTATE 309 (2012) (It.); Chiara Garilli, Le Azioni Positive nel Diritto Societario: 
le Quote di Genere nella Composizione degli Organi della Società per Azioni, in EUROPA 
DIR. PRIV. 885 (2012) (It.); Umberto Morera, Sulle Ragioni dell’Equilibrio di Genere 
negli Organi delle Società Quotate e Pubbliche, 112 RIV. DIR. COMM. 155 (2014) (It.). 
 32. Marco Baglioni & Giampaolo Grasso, Nuovo Codice di Autodisciplina Delle 
Società Quotate, 9 SOCIETÀ 1061, 1061 (2006) (It.). 
 33. This is strictly related to the fact that it is aligned to Decreto Legislativo 24 
febbraio 1998, n.58 G.U. July 12, 2011, n.120 at art. 147-ter (It.), as well as to Decreto 
Legislativo 28 dicembre 2005, n.262 G.U. Dec. 29, 2006, n.303 at art. 4 (It.). It advances 
the possibility of supporting candidates during GMs, consistently to the right to set a 
minimum quorum for the election of directors taken from the minority list. The 
consideration cannot, however, be transposed without any variation or adjustment in 
dissimilar contexts, therefore, Assonime calls for a timely intervention by the 
Supervisory Authority with reference to one-tier and two-tier systems. See Nicoletta 
Ciocca, IL VOTO DI LISTA NELLE SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI 388–420 (Giuffrè ed., 2018). 
 34. The connection by CONSOB mentioned under TUF Art. 148 is presumed, 
without providing a specific list. Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58 G.U. July 
12, 2011 n.120 at art. 148 (It.). 
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The purpose of list voting is to ensure that independent minority-
appointed directors 35  or auditors actually express the views of 
shareholders, not only the views of tricky majorities. 36  The list that 
obtained the highest number of votes must determine the directors in order 
to avoid excessive harmful penalizations, even for minority 
shareholders.37 The a priori exclusion of potential directors who will 
touch upon the controlling shareholders, in fact, could dangerously 
exclude–due to a weak, even indirect, link–candidates of remarkable and 
specific professional standing. 
Shareholders who are members of the same group or of a 
shareholders’ agreement may not vote, not even through a third party, for 
more than one list.38 Regardless of the specific reasons that led to the 
conclusion of any shareholders’ agreements, this regulation increases the 
importance of the conduct of these key figures in company dynamics. 
Hence, it is fundamental to value the vote of those whom, although 
connected to the control group, are called upon to express an opinion on 
the election of minority-appointed directors included on a given slate. In 
practice, these votes show their significance when the vote of a related 
entity contributes to reach the minimum threshold required by the bylaws 
for the participation of a slate. Indeed, the need to know these 
                                                                                                                                         
 35. On average, almost five directors, accounting for 47.6% of boards, are 
independent by TUF standards: these figures hit their highest values (respectively six and 
53.6%) in financial companies in 2016. CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance, 
supra note 2, at 18. Ninety-six firms count on average about two members appointed by 
minorities. CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 19. 
 36. Francesco Carbonetti, Amministratori e Sindaci di Minoranza e «Rapporti di 
Collegamento», 10 SOCIETÀ 1186 (2007) (It.). See also Ciocca, supra note 33, at 429–
42. 
 37. Although not crystal clear in its wording, which can potentially lead to 
inefficiencies, the second paragraph of TUF Art. 148 suggests that the people included 
in the list presented by minority shareholders should not be linked to majority 
shareholders, or to those who voted the list they presented. D. Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at 
art. 148 (2011) (It.). 
 38. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 148 (2011) (It.). 
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interrelations led to the elimination of secrecy in voting on directors,39 
prior to both the filing of the slate to the issuer40 and disclosure.41 
The board of directors, on the basis of a mere formal check, has to 
investigate any possible connection among slates. Consequently, the 
auditors are required to verify the accuracy of the directors’ investigation 
in accordance with TUF Art. 149. 42  The Chairman may verify the 
requirements only ex post, checking the accuracy of the procedure, the 
identity and legitimacy of each person, and the voting mechanisms.43 
2. Impacts of the Record Date 
The differentiation between ownership and voting rights is certainly 
one of the Copernican revolutions that characterized corporate law over 
the last decade.44 At the same time, the introduction of this legislation, 
following the implementation of the recently amended SHRD II, 
encourages short-term equity investments by those who are in a 
position—in terms of size and complexity of investment choices—to 
                                                                                                                                         
 39. Simone Alvaro, Giovanni Mollo & Giovanni Siciliano, Il voto di lista per la 
rappresentanza di azionisti di minoranza nell’organo di amministrazione delle società 
quotate, QUADERNO GIURIDICI 1, 19 (2012) (It.); see also Antonio Blandini, Riforma del 
Risparmio e Società Quotate: Voto Segreto, Voto di Lista e Dintorni 3 SOCIETÀ 269, 
(2006) (It.). 
 40. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 147-ter (2011) (It.). 
 41. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.20250 at art. 144-octies (2018) (It.). 
 42. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 149 (2011) (It.). 
 43. There is no doubt that Codice Civil Art. 2371 only draws a minimal list of 
powers, so that the prerogatives listed above cannot be taken away or varied due to 
bylaws or other corporate bodies. Codice civile [C.C.] [Civil Code] art. 2371 (It.). It is 
indisputable, however, that other powers can be attributed to the President according to 
the bylaws, shareholders’ regulations, and resolutions. See Filippo Laurini, Articolo 
2371: Presidenza dell’assemblea, in COMMENTARIO ALLA RIFORMA DELLE SOCIETÀ 147, 
147–87 (Piergaetano Marchetti, Luigi Bianchi, Federico Ghezzi & Mario Notari eds., 
2005) (It.). 
 44. Italian law provides that a statement must be made to the issuer confirming the 
attendance of shareholders’ meetings and the exercise of voting rights by the end of the 
third trading day prior to the date of the shareholders’ meeting on first call, or other 
deadline established in the Articles of Association of companies. D. Lgs. n. 58 (1998), 
n.120 at art. 83-sexies (2011) (It.). It is surely significant that after this deadline, all 
credits and debts entries shall not be considered for the purposes of voting rights at GMs. 
See id. 
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consciously carry out their roles as strategic members and, more 
generally, institutional investors.45 
To ensure maximum certainty in identifying persons entitled to 
exercise these rights at the GMs, and to avoid the immobilization (even if 
temporary) of the shares, Article 83-sexies reveals the true owners of the 
shares and also reports the votes of those who no longer hold any interest 
in the company.46 This prevents any abuse by hedge funds and, in broad 
strokes, by investors who intend to strategically influence the issuers.47 
To present slates, it is necessary to establish “another” record date 
that affords shareholders a reasonable amount of time for their 
organization.48 Such date is directly linked to the day the list is filed, 
approximately forty-five days before the date set for the GM.49 It is not 
viable or acceptable to grant the right to file one’s own list, even if it is 
compliant with the rules on relationships and avoids risk of potential 
abuse. 
The presentation of slates facilitates cooperation in an 
incontrovertible way.50 
Some authors believe that shareholders’ agreements for the joint 
presentation of slates cannot be construed as a shareholders’ agreement 
aimed at exercising voting rights and requiring prior consultation among 
them, since they are not limited to shareholders’ vote.51 In this case, no 
obligation is assumed with regard to the vote that will be cast at GMs.52 
Instead, one common decision is agreed upon based on the achievement 
of the minimum threshold of share ownership that the bylaws generally 
                                                                                                                                         
 45. Matteo Maria Erede, L’esercizio del Diritto di Intervento e Voto in Assemblea di 
Società con Titoli Quotati: Alcune Riflessioni in Tema di Legittimazione e Titolarità in 
Seguito all’Introduzione della Record Date, in SCRITTI GIURIDICI PER PIERGAETANO 
MARCHETTI 237–74, 240 (2011) (It.). 
 46. See D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 83-sexies (2011) (It.). 
 47. See Erede, supra note 45, at 248. 
 48. See D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 125-bis, 147-ter (2011) (It.). 
 49. See D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 125-bis (2011) (It.). 
 50. Chiara Mosca, Attivismo degli Azionisti, Voto di Lista e “Azione di Concerto”, 
58 RIV. SOC. 118, 141 (2013) (It.). 
 51. See generally, Pietro M. Fioruzzi & Francesco Lione, Il Problema delle Clausole 
Statutarie di Società Quotate che Attribuiscono al Consiglio di Amministrazione il Potere 
di Presentare una Lista per la Nomina di Amministratori o Sindaci, 4 RIV. DIR. SOC. 85, 
89-95 (2007) (It.). 
 52. Gian Franco Campobasso, Voto di Lista e Patti Parasociali nelle Società 
Quotate, 56 BANCA BORSA 125, 129 (2003). 
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provide for the submission of slates.53 The power to vote for or against 
the list does not actually correspond to the duty to vote for or against it.54 
Accordingly, such arrangement creates a free and unplanned aggregation 
prompted by list voting; however, the arrangement cannot take the form 
of a consultation agreement that requires a prior discussion of the matter 
because it is far from achieving a spontaneous aggregation.55 
Other authors, however, believe that such agreements should be 
related to TUF Art. 122, as it seems unlikely that they will lead to even 
minimal consultation on voting methods. 56  It would be difficult to 
imagine that such an arrangement, at least implicitly, does not include the 
obligation to vote for the list jointly submitted. 
II. LIST VOTING IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN OVERVIEW 
The U.S. practice of list voting cannot be interchanged 
transnationally.57 Even if list voting “offers greater certainty with respect 
to its impact on the composition of the board, and for this reason [it] can 
be, at the same time, less frightening to controlling groups and more 
reliable for qualified minorities,” evaluations need to be mindful of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 132; see also Mosca, supra note 50, at 139 nn.51 & 53. 
 56. Marco Ventoruzzo, La composizione del consiglio di amministrazione delle 
società quotate dopo il d.lgs. n. 303 del 2006: prime osservazioni, 52 RIV. SOC. 225-26 
(2005) (It.). 
 57. See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for 
Corporate Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2009) (discussing the 
inadequacy of a myopic comparison, and of a blind ranking, between the rules of different 
jurisdictions with different shareholder structures). For an overview of the systems in the 
United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, see Belcredi & Caprio, supra note 
12, at 26. As to legal transplants, the literature is certainly rich. See generally William 
Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 489 (1995); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 
MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in 
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994); Eric Stein, Uses, 
Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198 (1977); Gunther 
Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in 
New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998); Alan Watson, The Birth of Legal 
Transplants, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605 (2013). 
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operation of each legal system.58 As recently suggested by leading authors 
in the field: 
There is a convergent practice on the presence of independent 
directors on the board, whether in a two-tier board structure (for the 
supervisory board) or a one-tier structure. Yet the number of 
independent directors diverge; most common is two or three by law 
and [fifty] percent by voluntary measures (via a “comply or explain” 
Code). Jurisdictions vary on the numbers and ratios. Moreover, 
“national approaches on the definition of independence for 
independent directors vary considerably, particularly with regard to 
maximum tenure and independence from a significant shareholder.” 
These differences would predictably result in divergence on the 
independence-in-fact of nominally “independent” directors and 
indeed, their putative function.59 
List voting would be beneficial to minority shareholders when there 
is a controlling shareholder, but not when the corporation exceeds a 
certain size. It is preferable to create a single list composed of independent 
directors, drawn up by the nomination committee of the outgoing board, 
to be submitted to shareholders with voting rights.60 With a single list, the 
directors who obtained the highest number of votes would be elected, and, 
if the minimum number of directors required is not reached, the appointed 
directors would co-opt other directors, excluding those who have not 
obtained the vote of the activists. The selected names would then be 
submitted to the shareholders, thus allowing institutional investors to 
influence the composition of the board, even without making direct 
decisions. 
Other authors allege that this change is simply a replication of the  
system that already exists in the United States, but in a radically different 
                                                                                                                                         
 58. Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A 
Revolution in the Making, 8 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 105, 144 (2011). 
 59. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0 (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 15) (citing ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 2017 Corporate Governance Factbook at 95-96, 98-100, 108-111). 
 60. See Luca Enriques & Luigi Zingales, Il Voto di Lista non Basta nei Big a 
Capitale Diffuso, IL SOLE 24 ORE (May 21, 2015) (It.), https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/ 
commenti-e-idee/2015-05-21/il-voto-lista-non-basta-big-capitale-diffuso—071129.sht 
ml?uuid=ABwo71jD&refresh_ce=1 [https://perma.cc/689E-FDLP]. See generally 
Ciocca, supra note 33. 
2018] LIST VOTING'S TRAVELS: THE IMPORTANCE 121 
OF BEING INDEPENDENT IN THE BOARDROOM 
context.61 Thus, institutional investors would be strongly encouraged to 
propose one-third or two-fifths of the board. If the list presented by 
institutional investors obtains the highest number of votes, a higher 
number of directors would somehow connect to it, even if the absolute 
majority was not elected. 
Because a complete country-based study would be impossible for the 
purposes of this article, the overview provided herein should be seen as a 
background against which empirical findings should be placed. 
In the United States, independent directors first appeared mainly as 
a result of the Penn Central scandal.62 Whether minority shareholders 
should appoint independent directors is still subject to debate, due to 
varying corporate structures, the presence of stronger minority 
shareholders and more developed institutional investors, and the absence 
of abuse by majority shareholders.63 More recently, Professors Goshen 
and Hamdani pointed out that: 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. See supra, Part I.A. 
 62. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the U.S., 1950-
2005: of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1515 
(2007); see also NYSE Constitution, Rule 2495H (Jan. 6, 1977); NYSE Listed Company 
Manual, § 303A.01 (2015) (as amended on Nov. 25, 2009) (“Listed companies must have 
a majority of independent directors. Commentary: Effective boards of directors exercise 
independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of 
independent directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the 
possibility of damaging conflicts of interest.”); NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 
303A.02 (2015). 
 63. It is relevant to emphasize that, in the United States, the nomination committee 
requires listed companies to have an ad hoc committee entirely composed of independent 
directors, with a written regulation to tackle its purpose(s) and responsibilities, and whose 
annual performance is evaluated. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04 (2015). 
Recently, a relevant piece emphasized the need to re-define the concept and to assure a 
strong enforcement to it, since “‘regulating directors’ independence is at heart a means 
of empowering investors to make informed decisions about where to invest and how to 
vote.” Yaron Nili, Out of Sight Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director 
Independence Disclosure, 43 UNIV. J. CORP. L. 35, 35 (2017). Nili posited: 
The current framework can be summed up as being too much, too little, too late and too 
soft. It provides companies with too much discretion, as boards retain too much power 
to assert the independence of their peer directors [,] and they may suffer from behavioral 
bias in doing so. It provides investors with too little information regarding the factual 
context against which a director is considered to be independent. Further, even when a 
director’s independence designation is scrutinized through state law, it is often too late, 
as these assessments are done post-hoc when it is too late to address many of the issues 
that director independence is meant to protect against. Finally, it is too soft, as 
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These prophylactic measures may be necessary to enforce the rule 
against self-dealing . . . however . . . lawmakers should proceed 
cautiously when constraining controllers’ power to appoint board or 
management positions . . . [since] asymmetric information and 
differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur from 
credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision not only to investors, 
but also to skeptical independent board members. Therefore, the need 
to balance controller rights and minority protection should also shape 
board reforms at firms with controlling shareholders. At a minimum, 
the controller should have the power to appoint a majority of the 
board, which in turn should have the power to appoint the CEO and 
other members of management.64 
The voice of all shareholders is vital overseas as well. Until a few 
years ago, investors had a limited impact on the board composition due to 
their spread and currently decreasing apathy. NYSE Rule 452, abolished 
in 2009, allowed financial intermediaries to vote freely in the absence of 
direction from their clients.65 
In the United States, regulations facilitating the access of 
shareholders to the proxy system ensure the presence of minorities on the 
board.66 While the collection of proxies is rooted in the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, minority shareholders could initiate an 
independent solicitation of proxies.67 However, initiating an independent 
solicitation may result in disproportionate costs. A proportional 
reimbursement rule, adopted either contractually or in the bylaws, would 
                                                                                                                                         
companies’ self-designations of director independence are left uncontested and without 
proper vetting by the stock exchanges or the SEC, as they have shown no effort to 
proactively enforce their own requirements. 
Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). See also Puchniak & Kim, supra note 9, at 98 (“[I]t makes 
perfect sense that the NYSE and NASDAQ definitions of ‘independence’ focus on 
ensuring that independent directors are independent from the managers of the corporation 
on whose board they sit”). 
 64. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 
125 YALE L. J. 560, 601 (2016). 
 65. NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 452 (Jan. 11, 1968). 
 66. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). See also MARC. I. STEINBERG, THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 184-190 (2018) (providing a brief 
overview of proxy access and Rule 14a-11); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD 
HENDERSON, OUTSOURCING THE BOARD: HOW BOARD SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN 
IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 171-172 (2018) (providing a brief overview of proxy 
access in the United States). 
 67. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
2018] LIST VOTING'S TRAVELS: THE IMPORTANCE 123 
OF BEING INDEPENDENT IN THE BOARDROOM 
allow the reimbursement of expenses, at least in part, by the company 
itself.68 
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the court discussed 
a proposal to insert a clause in the bylaws to allow proxy access and 
reimbursement of soliciting proxies’ costs, but ultimately held that such a 
clause was invalid, the approval of which would have violated the 
obligations of the directors toward the company.69 Even though it was 
considered invalid, the inclusion of the clause in the bylaws, and the 
reimbursement of the expenses incurred by shareholders, were transposed 
into Delaware legislation.70 
Pursuant to Rule 14a-11, any shareholder (or shareholder group) that 
held more than 3% of a public company’s shares for more than three 
consecutive years was eligible to nominate candidates for up to 25% of 
the board seats.71 A qualifying shareholder could exercise this privilege 
as long as she declared that she would continue to hold her shares after 
the annual GM and did not acquire them with the intention of changing 
control of the company or obtaining more representatives than those 
permitted by the law.72 In the presence of either a staggered board or 
directors already elected by the minority in the context of the GM, the 
minority-appointed directors could be nominated only if they did not 
exceed 25% of the total directors. 73  When the slates submitted by 
minorities exceeded that limit, the company must, at the time of sending 
the proxy materials, give preference to shareholders with a higher share 
capital by listing the names presented by them only where still necessary 
to reach the 25% threshold.74 The rule was debated but short-lived.75 The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the defendant in Business Roundtable 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. See id. 
 69. 953 A.2d 227, 239-40 (2008). 
 70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112-13 (2009) 
 71. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,667, 56,674, 
56,706 (Sept. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249); see also 
Reilly S. Steel, Proxy Access and Optimal Standardization in Corporate Governance: 
An Empirical Analysis, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 173, 185-88 (2017); Jill E. Fisch, 
The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L. J. 435, 466-67 (2012). 
 72. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 71, at 56,699. 
 73. See id. at 56,675. 
 74. See id. at 56,711-12. 
 75. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See also, Bernard S. 
Sharfman, What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us about Proxy Access, 13 J. 
L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 36-38 (2017). 
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v. SEC, opposed its application, arguing before the D.C. Circuit Court that 
the main problems of proxy access are the creation of interpersonal 
conflicts, the inefficient cost-benefit ratio calculated incorrectly by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and that it allows top 
management to exclude proposals concerning the election of 
shareholders.76 
Rule 14a-8, however, remains unchanged, ensuring shareholders the 
right to propose through the proxy system the use of the proxy access in 
the bylaws, thus allowing a mechanism that would lead to the same 
result.77 The bylaws, in fact, have created a very similar scheme to the one 
initially provided for by the SEC; in order to include names on the slates 
for one fifth of the eligible directors, the group of shareholders formed for 
this purpose should not exceed twenty directors and should possess at 
least 3% of corporate shares for three years.78 
The first and, so far, the only attempt to actually use the proxy access 
rule for the appointment of directors occurred in the “Gabelli Funds—
National Fuel Gas” case, in which Mario Gabelli and GAMCO Asset 
Management Inc. withdrew the initial nomination, dated November 9, 
2016, due to alleged violation of the bylaws.79 The latter claimed that only 
passive investors could submit it, however, the tool is meant for those 
directors who are not willing to influence or alter the governance of the 
company.80 Gabelli evidently aimed to achieve a different goal, reiterated 
in several public statements and in the use of Form 13-D, instead of Form 
13-G, revealing the intention to change the corporate structure.81 
                                                                                                                                         
 76. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. 
 77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2013); Danielle Vukovich, Proxy Access Voting: 
Evaluating Proxy Access and the Recent Phenomenon of Corporations Adopting 
Shareholder Protective Policies, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 437, 446 (2018). 
 78. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 71, at 56,772. 
 79. See Notice of Proxy Access Director Nomination at the 2017 Annual Meeting of 
Stockholders of National Fuel Gas Company from Paula Ciprich to David Goldman, 
(November 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70145/0001193125167 
76709/d296488dex99.htm [https://perma.cc/9XEW-CPPC]. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. Mr. Gabelli believed that “the board still need[ed] an infusion of fresh 
thinking” and that “the company should be split up with the pieces spun off” even though 
a spin-off was not being considered by the company’s board. Id. “Mr. Gabelli’s 
statements continue[d] to reflect GAMCO’s desire to influence management on matters 
of control and [did] not disavow earlier support for splitting up the company’s business.” 
Id. 
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This situation poses several contentious issues for consideration: the 
appropriateness of the calculation methods of shares held by different 
funds under a single manager (SGR/Fund Manager), the limit to 
shareholders’ aggregation set to access the proxy, the re-election 
procedure, the universal proxy ballot, and the exclusion of the proposal 
pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(10).82 
Since the market’s concern with escaping from the “dictatorship” of 
the CEO is strong, the implementation and effective use of this tool for 
the purposes of appointing directors is comparable to a loaded gun.83 
The phenomenon of list voting is rather rare in other countries.84 
Although it has established its relevance and demonstrated its 
effectiveness by ensuring proportionality in the election of governing 
corporate bodies, list voting is undoubtedly an attribute of good corporate 
governance, limiting agency costs, and improving the balance between 
different interests, especially in cases of concentrated ownership 
structures. 85  Certain countries, however, provide for shareholder 
representation in various forms: (1) with the possibility of competing for 
a mandatory appointment (if provided in the bylaws) (Italy, the United 
States, Spain, Poland, and Brazil), (2) with the possibility of competing 
for an optional appointment (Germany and France), or (3) with the right 
of veto (the United Kingdom and Israel).86 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2013). 
 83. Marco Ventoruzzo, Professor, Bocconi Univ., Introductory Speech at the Italian 
Corporate Governance Conference (Dec. 3, 2015), http://icgconference.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/12/Introductory-speech_Marco-Ventoruzzo_3rd-Dec.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/M2F2-CNWX]. 
 84. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Quante Sfide per la Consob, LAVOCE (May 6, 2016), 
http://www.lavoce.info/archives/40937/quante-sfide-per-la-consb [https://perma.cc/7G 
ZN-Z2DW]. See also Vukovich, supra note 77, at 463-68 (providing a comparative 
overview of Canadian and Australian regulation). 
 85. See Nicolas L. Erhardt, James D. Werbel & Charles B. Shrader, Board of 
Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L. 
REV. 102, 107-08 (2003). 
 86. See, e.g., Decreto No. 6.404 de 15 dezembro 1976, Diário Oficial Da União 
[D.O.U.] de 15.12.1976 at art. 243 (Braz.). See generally Secretary of the Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FACTBOOK (2017). 
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The relevant law in Spain, which bears similarities to Italian law,87 
states the principle of minority shareholder protection based on the 
proportional composition of the board itself.88 It should be noted that this 
technique is not widely used in Spain, due to the peculiar board 
composition,89 the apathy of institutional investors, and the strong conflict 
of interests.90 Shareholders, within both listed and unlisted corporations, 
may gather and appoint a number of directors equal to the ratio of the 
capital with voting rights and number of board members.91 
In Poland, when a group of shareholders represents at least one-fifth 
of the total, such group can request the election of one director, without 
participating in the appointment of other directors.92 
Since 2001, Brazilian corporate law allows 15% of shareholders with 
voting rights and 10% of shareholders without voting rights to apply the 
voto múltiplo technique, which resembles cumulative voting, though not 
expressly provided for in the bylaws. 93  Nonetheless, by virtue of a 
proportional board composition, in the event of the dismissal of one 
                                                                                                                                         
 87. See Approving the Consolidated Text of the Corporate Enterprises Act (R.D.L. 
2010, 1) (Spain) (declaring in Article 243 that in a public limited company, shares 
voluntarily grouped to constitute share capital equal to or more than the sum resulting 
from dividing the capital by the number of directors are entitled to appoint the number of 
directors deducted from the corresponding proportion; in the event that this option is 
invoked, the shares that have been gathered in this way are not entitled to vote on the rest 
of the board members). 
 88. See Javier Juste Mencia, La Partecipazione Della Minoranza Nella Nomina 
Degli Amministratori di Società per Azioni: Sulla Possibilità di Introdurre un Sistema 
Proporzionale di Elezione, 20 GIUR. COMM. 961, 975 (1994) (It.). 
 89. This is notably due to the presence of the “gray directors,” which are independent 
directors who still maintain roles on the board after serving the company. See generally 
Ana Gisbert Clemente & Begoña Navallas Labat, Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
and Voluntary Disclosure: The Role of Independent Directors in the Boards of Listed 
Spanish Firms 5-6 (2009), http://webs.ucm.es/centros/cont/descargas/documento16048 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P7X-DWDL]. 
 90. See Mencia, supra note 88, at 966-67. 
 91. See id. at 970. 
 92. See THE COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE art. 385, § 3 (Pol.). 
 93. See Decreto No. 6.404 de 15 dezembro 1976, Diário Oficial Da União [D.O.U.] 
de 15.12.1976 at art. 141 (Braz.); see also Érica Gorga, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & 
Bernard S. Black, The Corporate Governance of Privately Controlled Brazilian Firms, 7 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FINANÇAS 385, 398-99 (2009). 
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director, and in accordance with the simul stabunt, simul cadent rule, the 
entire board would cease to function.94 
Other countries attach great importance to the voice of employees, 
including Germany,95 Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, France, 
and Finland, albeit the latter two also have opt-in mechanisms that are 
weaker than those allowing employees holding more than 3% of the share 
capital to appoint one or more directors.96 According to Aktiengesetz, the 
German Stock Corporate Code, the election of certain members may be 
reserved to certain shareholders or to specific categories of shares 
transferable with the consent of the company.97 Also, shareholders may 
propose the name of a director, if any, and make it available (via the 
website, if the company is listed) at least fourteen days prior to the GMs.98 
Finally, each shareholder has the right to propose candidates for the 
appointment of the supervisory board.99 This provision strengthens the 
position of employees, who are specially and specifically protected by 
this technique. 
In the event that the bylaws mention the codetermination model, the 
board of a public company can be composed of four representatives 
selected by employees.100 In non-public companies, there can be three 
such representatives if the board is composed of more than fifteen 
directors, and two representatives if the board has fewer than fifteen 
directors. 101  In public companies with more than two thousand 
employees, however, the employees’ representatives should not exceed 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. Piergaetano Marchetti, Gianfranco Siciliano & Marco Ventoruzzo, Dissenting 
Directors, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in L., Paper No. 332, 
2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854768## [https://perma.cc 
/KT9Y-CPQM]. 
 95. See generally Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A 
Study of German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863 (2004) (explaining the 
effectiveness of the model, especially with regard to performance target). 
 96. Holly J. Gregory & Robert T. Simmelkjaer, II, Comparative Study of Corporate 
Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States (2002). 
 97. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965 BGBL I § 101 
(Ger.). 
 98. See id. § 1262. 
 99. See id. § 127. 
 100. See Mitbestimmung [MitbestG] [Law on Employee Participation], May 4, 1976 
BGBL I at 1153, last amended, Apr. 24, 2015, BGBL I at 642, art 7 (Ger.). 
 101. Id. 
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half of the board.102 On the other hand, in private companies and public 
companies with fewer than two thousand employees, employees’ 
representatives can be a maximum of one third of the board, assuming the 
company is composed of at least twenty employees.103 
France does not regulate the appointment of directors and, except as 
provided by law, does not select representatives of specific groups and 
interests.104 
Russian law provides that the GMs may revoke the entire board, not 
just one of its members, and elect its plenum using cumulative voting, as 
provided for in the bylaws (or mandatorily for the corporations with more 
than a thousand shareholders). 105  The normative framework–which is 
careful in identifying, assessing, and managing conflicts of interest–
allows minority-appointed directors to prevent any potentially dangerous 
action on the part of executive directors and controlling shareholders.106 
Chinese legislation adopts cumulative voting, in which the voting 
rights attributable to each shareholder would be multiplied by the number 
of seats available and could converge in one person having many votes.107 
                                                                                                                                         
 102. See Gorton & Schmid, supra note 95, at 864. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Code de gouvernance d’entreprise des sociétés cotées [Corporate Governance 
Code of Listed Corporations] art. 2.3 (Fr.) 
 105. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 66 
(Russ.). 
 106. Id. at art. 81-84. 
 107. Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó gōngsī fǎ (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective Mar. 1, 2013) 2005 STANDING COMM. NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG GAZ. art. 105, 106 (China). Until 2001, the cumulative voting system 
was not suggested for listed companies with controlling shareholders owning more than 
the 30% of the share capital. Zhōngguó shàngshì gōngsī zhìlǐ zhǔnzé (中国上市公司治理准
则) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China] (promulgated by the 
China Sec. Reg. Comm. Jan. 1, 2001) art. 31, at 1, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/ 
code_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NAL-X3AU] (China). Such companies shall implement 
their bylaws and are encouraged to adopt cumulative voting in the election of directors 
(including independent directors) and supervisors. In case a shareholder holds solely (or 
collectively with affiliated parties) over 50% of the equity interest of a securities 
company, cumulative voting shall be used in the election of directors (including 
independent ones) and supervisors. Zhèngquàn gōngsī zhàn dìng gōngsī zhìlǐ zhǔnzé(证
券公司暂定公司治理准则) [Provisional Code of Corporate Governance for Securities 
Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm. 2004) art. 17, http://www.ecgi. 
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Japanese law has proven to be “quite strong” on this matter, even 
though foreign investors criticize Japanese law for not adequately 
protecting shareholders’ interests.108 If the majority of voting shares are 
present at the GM, the board is elected by simple majority, allowing 
shareholders to take a decisive role, including the proposal of 
candidates.109 
In light of the considerations outlined above, it is difficult to express 
an opinion on list voting and its “travels” in a clear and decisive global 
sense. It is therefore appropriate to seek a different tool to assess whether 
list voting deserves a chance to realize its full potential and be 
implemented in different jurisdictions. 
III. LIST VOTING AND DIVIDEND POLICIES: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
This part will present empirical data that shows the impact of list 
voting on corporate boards, 110 especially from those authors who are 
influenced by an Anglo-Saxon, rather than German, tradition.111 Thus, the 
much-debated topic of dividend policies emphasizes how vital it is to 
balance interests and demonstrate the essential role of independent 
                                                                                                                                         
org/codes/documents/provisional_cgcode_csrc. pdf [https://perma.cc/82HR-TFDH] 
(China). 
 108. See Gen Goto, Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY 
& VENTURE CAP. L. 125, 126-27 (2014) (highlighting that the Japanese Code provides 
for particularly strong protective mechanisms for single shareholders and holders of 
special categories of shares). 
 109. Id. at 132, 135. 
 110. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000). 
 111. “Empiricism is also a unifying theme of several of the increasingly influential 
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of law.” Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. 
Ulen, Symposium: Empirical and Experimental Methods of Law: Introduction, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 791, 791 (2002). Among scholars, in fact, there are three “species” of 
researchers (“clams, dolphins, and plankton”) that also differ in their approaches to 
studying: doers, users, or critics. This could lead to multiple combinations emerging: “a 
dolphin would include the ‘movers and shakers of the legal academy[,] grounded in 
traditional legal scholarship [but using] empirical research to increase our understanding 
of the law and to add to the tools available to legal researchers.’” Id. at 792-93; see also 
Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and 
Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 808 (2002). 
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minority-appointed directors.112 Managers, in fact, can freely use (and 
abuse) cash flows for personal purposes through the manipulation of 
dividend distribution.113 
The issue of dividend policies has recently been re-examined in 
different countries. Recent studies have found two correlations in 
particular: first, between the existence of dividend policies and the 
presence of women on boards,114 and second, between the existence of 
dividend policies and certain key characteristics of independent directors, 
including tenure, functions, and remuneration.115  This suggests that it 
                                                                                                                                         
 112. Cf. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing 
Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2001); Jorge 
Farinha, Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment 
Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1173, 1173-74 (2003); 
Aidong Hu & Praveen Kumar, Managerial Entrenchment and Payout Policy, 39 J. FIN. 
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 759, 759-61 (2004); Fuxiu Jiang, Yunbiao Ma & Beibei Shi, 
Stock Liquidity and Dividend Payouts, 42 J. CORP. FIN. 295, 295 (2017) (providing 
evidence that the “positive relation between stock liquidity and dividend payouts is more 
pronounced when the information environment is opaque, and when conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors is severe”); Hao Wang, Managerial 
Entrenchment, Equity Payout and Capital Structure, 35 J. BANK. & FIN. 36, 36-37 (2011). 
 113. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 650, 651, 653 (1984); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323, 323 
(1986); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976). 
 114. See Jie Chen, Woon Sau Leung & Marc Goergen, The Impact of Board Gender 
Composition on Dividend Payouts, 43 J. CORP. FIN. 86, 87 (2017); María Consuelo 
Pucheta-Martínez & Inmaculada Bel-Oms, The Board of Directors and Dividend Policy: 
The Effect of Gender Diversity, 25 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 523, 526-28 (2016). 
 115. See Suba R. Yarram & Brian E. Dollery, Corporate Governance and Financial 
Policies: Influence of Board Characteristics on the Dividend Policy of Australian Firms, 
41 MANAGERIAL FIN. 267, 268 (2015). See generally Timothy G. Coville & Gary 
Kleinman, Independent Directors and Dividend Payouts in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 
in 18 SUSTAINABILITY AND GOVERNANCE (ADVANCES IN PUBLIC INTEREST ACCOUNTING) 
57 (Cheryl R. Leyman ed., 2015) (revealing a positive relationship between firms 
compelled by law to change boards and payout policies, when compared to firms that 
pre-adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate board composition requirements); Amy E. Ji, 
Board Financial Expertise and Corporate Payout Policy, 19 J. APP. BUS. & ECON. 10 
(2017) (finding that a greater percentage of financial experts on company boards leads to 
the adoption of payout policies based only on repurchases, instead of dividends); Lucas 
Setia-Atmaja, Dividend and Debt Policies of Family Controlled Firms: The Impact of 
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would be extremely difficult for minority shareholders to be adequately 
safeguarded, at least in most cases, without appointing independent 
directors. As this Article will investigate further, it appears that the link 
between the presence of minority-appointed independent directors and the 
propensity to distribute dividends is strong. 
As a premise, it is worthwhile to illustrate the line of research. The 
following sections aim to clarify the research design and the sources used 
to retrieve the necessary information. Extensive literature was taken into 
account, both to recognize the historically significant contributions on the 
topic, and to identify the variables deemed essential to carry out the 
quantitative study and develop the arguments. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Some corporate governance mechanisms are meant to increase 
“transparency, accountability and efficiency of corporate governance” in 
order to aid independent (and independent minority-appointed) 
directors. 116  Multiple international studies of these mechanisms 
demonstrate that there is an increased risk that shareholders holding less 
than 10 to 20% of the shares overly influence the board—even appointing 
its majority—thus, controlling the strategic decisions despite their limited 
investments.117  Furthermore, independent directors are crucial in both 
                                                                                                                                         
Board Independence, 6 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 128 (2010); Vineeta Sharma, 
Independent Directors and the Propensity to Pay Dividends, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1001, 1002-
04 (2011). A recent study also examined dividend payouts, but used a novel measure: co-
opted directors, who are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumed office and their 
presence leads to a weaker tendency to pay dividends. See generally Pornsit Jiraporn & 
Sang M. Lee, Do Co-Opted Directors Influence Dividend Policy?, 47 FIN. MGMT. 349 
(2018). 
 116. Nuria Reguera-Alvarado & Francisco Bravo, The Effect of Independent 
Directors’ Characteristics on Firm Performance: Tenure and Multiple Directorship, 41 
RES. IN INT’L. BUS. & FIN. 590, 591 (2017). 
 117. See Sandra Cavaco, Patricia Crifo, Antoine Rebérioux & Gwenael Roudaut, 
Independent Directors: Less Informed but Better Selected than Affiliated Board 
Members?, 43 J. CORP. FIN. 106, 108-10 (2017); Yong Wang, Penjian Jin & Chongsheng 
Yang, Relations Between the Professional Backgrounds of Independent Directors in 
State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Performance, 42 INT’L. REV. ECON. & FIN. 404, 
405-06 (2016); see also Harald Baum, The Rise of the Independent Director: A Historical 
and Comparative Perspective 2, 5 (Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 16/20, 
2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814978 [https://perma.cc/ 
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dispersed and concentrated corporate structures,118 looking to Italy as a 
leading example in terms of protection of the minority shareholders’ 
rights, thanks to the Italian practice of list voting. 
The discussion on independent directors and their propensity to pay 
dividends, initially proposed by Modigliani and Miller,119 still remains a 
real “puzzle.”120  A prudent dividend policy could concretely mitigate 
conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                         
T5N4-CU4V] (claiming that independent directors are strongly connected to the context 
in which they operate, even though path dependence is not always considered in 
theoretical discussions and practice as a true panacea for governance issues); Wei Cai, 
The Dilemmas of Independent Directors in China: An Empirical and Comparative Study, 
18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 123, 147-48 (2017); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured 
Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. 
REV. 19, 31-32; Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ 
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 97, 120 (2016). For studies about the link between investment 
and performance, see generally, Wei Jiang, Hualin Wan & Shan Zhao, Reputation 
Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting, 29 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 655 (2016); Yu F. Kuang & Gladys Lee, Corporate Fraud and External Social 
Connectedness of Independent Directors, 45 J. CORP. FIN. 401 (2017); Huilong Liu, Hong 
Wang & Liansheng Wu, Removing Vacant Chairs: Does Independent Directors’ 
Attendance at Board Meetings Matter?, 133 J. BUS. ETHICS 375 (2016); Piergaetano 
Marchetti, Gianfranco Siciliano & Marco Ventoruzzo, Dissenting Directors, (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in L., Paper No. 332, 2016) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854768## [https://perma.cc/KT 
9Y-CPQM]; Ronald Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, Preoccupied Independent 
Directors (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No. 522, 
2017) https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/5222017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZMT-Z85F]; Dan W. Puchniak & Luh L. Lan, Independent Directors 
in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 265 
(2017); Jigao Zhu, Kangtao Ye, Jennifer W. Tucker & Kam C. Chan, Board Hierarchy, 
Independent Directors, and Firm Value: Evidence from China, 41 J. CORP. FIN. 262 
(2016). 
 118. Ferrarini & Filippelli, supra note 12, at 30 (stressing that independent directors 
represent a tool to strengthen the role of the management, primarily in contexts of 
dispersed ownership). See also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1282-83; 
Strampelli, supra note 5, at 14-19. 
 119. See generally Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, 
and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961); see also S. Paulo & C. Gale, The 
Miller-Modigliani 1961 Ponzi Scheme, Alias “Dividend Irrelevance”, 54 INT’L J.L. 
MGMT. 234, 234-35 (2012) (emphasizing the crucial role that Miller & Modigliani’s 
original paper continues to have in modern scholarly literature). 
 120. Sharma, supra note 115, at 1001. 
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Dividends may, in fact, curb agency problems and reduce agency costs.121 
A higher dividend policy would increase the likelihood of using external 
funds more frequently.122 This could lead to conflicts of interest due to 
asymmetric information between shareholders and management when the 
company generates a cash flow that is not in line with its investment 
opportunities. Dividend policy is negatively correlated to close corporate 
structure 123  and close ownership, 124  and positively correlated to 
shareholders’ agreements, confirming that the protection of minority 
shareholders’ concerns remains an absolutely fundamental issue in Italian 
corporate law.125 
C. DATASET: SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
During this research (the basic guidelines of which have been 
outlined above), it was difficult to identify all the independent directors126 
appointed in the period between 2005 and 2015, and to determine whether 
they were appointed from minority lists. In Italy, there is no 
comprehensive official database for figures on independent directors, as 
is also the case, unexpectedly, in China.127 Accordingly, for the purposes 
                                                                                                                                         
 121. See Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of 
Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 J. FIN. RESEARCH 249, 249-50 (1982). See generally Eugene 
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 
301, 308 (1983) (discussing various means of mitigating agency costs). 
 122. See Easterbrook, supra note 113, at 656. 
 123. See Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, Dividends and 
Expropriation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 55 (2001). 
 124. See Luciana Mancinelli & Aydin Ozkan, Ownership Structure and Dividend 
Policy: Evidence from Italian Firms, 12 EUR. J. FIN. 265, 267 (2006). 
 125. Id. at 269. Some possible pathways of causation must be emphasized: more 
independent directors will pay more dividends, whereas less independent directors lead 
to an increased need to signal with dividends. Thus, list voting should lead to fewer 
dividends. 
 126. Independent directors are defined pursuant to Codice di Autodisciplina 
[Corporate Governance Code] Luglio 2018, art. 3, Jul. 2018, (It.). 
 127. Many studies focus on the implications of independent directors because they 
serve as an important source of inspiration for further development in corporate 
governance. For examples, see generally Easterbrook, supra note 113; Murya Habbash, 
Are Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors Effective in Constraining Earnings 
Management?, 5 J. FIN. ACCT. & MGMT. 125 (2014); Guoqiang Hu, Rongli Yuan & Jason 
Zezhong Xiao, Can Independent Directors Improve Internal Control Quality in China?, 
23 EUR. J. FIN. 626 (2014); Liu, Wang & Wu, supra note 117; Yi Quan & Sihai Li, Are 
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of this study, creation of such a database was an extremely important step. 
The relevant data, collected piece by piece, did not include the companies 
listed on the Italian Alternative Investment Market (the sub-market of the 
Milan Stock Exchange dedicated to SMEs), which is characterized by 
flexible regulation and for which publication on the website of both 
reports on governance and remuneration is not required. 
DataStream, a well-known factual database in the financial and 
economic field worldwide, allowed for identification of all listed Italian 
companies. As of June 30, 2016, there were 273 listed companies on the 
Borsa Italiana’s Main Market (MTA).128 The study then evaluated the 
consolidated financial statements, the ownership structure, the reports on 
corporate governance, and remuneration of all companies identified by 
Datastream in order to choose all the independent directors to be 
examined. 
Next, the study examined corporate governance and remuneration 
reports to determine whether the directors were selected from a slate 
submitted by majority or minority shareholders. If such information was 
not provided in those reports, then the study looked to the website of the 
company (where slates for the renewal of the board are uploaded), or 
inspected the minutes of the GMs for the appointment of directors (in 
which slates are mentioned in detail or to which slates are attached), for 
the years after the introduction of compulsory list voting systems. 
Finally, the study extrapolated from DataStream financial data 
related to dividend distribution, mainly, payments, sales, cash flow, total 
assets, return on assets, and annual earnings, all of which are necessary to 
tackle the CEO duality issues. The study also evaluated M&A deals, 
which were retrieved from Thomson One. The sample consists of 1260 
observations. 
                                                                                                                                         
Academic Independent Directors Punished More Severely When They Engage in 
Violations?, 10 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 71 (2017); Xuesong Tang, Jun Du & Qingchuan 
Hou, The Effectiveness of the Mandatory Disclosure of Independent Directors’ Opinions: 
Empirical Evidence from China, 32 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2013); Zhu, Ye, Tucker 
& Chan, supra note 117. Indeed, there is no shortage of studies regarding how to increase 
minority shareholders’ protections in and related to the new form of cumulative voting 
in China. See Wenjia Yan, Cumulative Voting: In the US (Declining), in China (Rising) 
and the EU (Not-Adopted), 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 79, 80 (2015). 
 128. There were two potential issues affecting, and even slightly distorting, the study: 
companies could have been listed at any time from 2005 to 2015, or companies could 
have been listed from 2005 but de-listed before the end of June 2016. 
2018] LIST VOTING'S TRAVELS: THE IMPORTANCE 135 
OF BEING INDEPENDENT IN THE BOARDROOM 
The analysis accounts for certain parameters normally used for data 
classification, which are linked to the sector in which each company 
operates (keeping in mind the Super Sector indices used by the Italian 
Stock Exchange that, in turn, refer to Industry Classification Benchmark 
aggregates). 129  This classification is informative given the significant 
differences among categories, and it serves to illustrate evolutionary 
developments and, de iure condendo, to identify the areas in which more 
emphasis should be placed in the regulation of list voting. 
The following statistical analysis uses an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) model, commonly used in the analysis of clustered data. It should 
be noted that the model does not include some variables that 
simultaneously determine both the independent variable (independent 
directors) and the dependent variable (payout dividends). Thus, the causal 
relationship between the two variables is not very close (and could even 
be reversed, whereby more independent directors may be appointed to 
distribute more dividends).130 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This Article aims to investigate the role of independent directors, 
particularly minority-appointed independent directors, to verify their 
quality, the effectiveness of list voting, and the increase in the value of 
dividend payouts. Thus, the following assumptions are tested: 
H1: Companies with a significant number of independent directors 
favor high levels of dividends. As previously stated, independent 
directors carry out monitoring functions to protect the interests of 
shareholders, overseeing the correct management of the dividend 
policy. 
                                                                                                                                         
 129. See, e.g., Borsa Italiana, STOCK INDICES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www. 
borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/statistiche/statistiche-indici/statistiche-indici.en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9QB4-224Z]. 
 130. Based on a two-stage regression, the Heckman correction (which is commonly 
used to correct selection bias) allows for calculating the predicted values of the X 
variable, even before the regression analysis is applied. In other words, the Heckman 
correction purifies the X variable of those omitted variables that could blame the 
coefficient when carrying out the regression. Future research could refine this study with 
an Instrumental Variable approach. 
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H2: Companies with a high number of independent minority-
appointed directors favor high levels of dividends. In light of the 
importance of independent minority-appointed directors, it is 
appropriate to verify how their presence leads to tangible benefits for 
shareholders. 
H3: Independent minority-appointed directors are particularly 
effective in companies with a concentrated ownership structure. It is 
widely accepted that the controlling shareholders affect the 
appointment of independent directors.131 If minority directors really 
intend to enrich and protect minority shareholders, their presence in 
closely-held companies should be more active. To the contrary, their 
role would be less significant in widespread ownership structures, 
where the gap between majority and minority shareholders is less 
perceived.132 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The analysis consists of two phases: the first phase focuses on the 
probability of distribution of the higher dividends if at least one-third of 
the board consists of independent directors, and the second phase 
evaluates such probability if the board consists of more than 15% of 
independent minority-appointed directors. 
Two models are used to verify the first hypothesis: one model 
includes the fixed effects of each industry and the time horizon, while the 
second model does not. The same process is applied to the second 
hypothesis in order to understand these effects, even when the control 
variable is linked to the presence of directors taken from the minority list. 
The analysis took into consideration the characteristics of the 
sample, noting that more than a third of the board is composed of 
independent directors, and that more than 15% of the board itself is 
composed of minority-appointed directors and the CEO-duality is 
                                                                                                                                         
 131. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1286-87. 
 132. Although the hypothesis is verified with regard to the Italian context, the result 
is, of course, also applicable to other widely-held corporate scenarios, and, therefore, in 
the United States (where the number of public corporations halved in the last twenty years 
from more than 8,000 in 1996 to about 4,100 in 2012). Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi 
& René Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 464 (2017); Gustavo Grullon, 
Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 
(Oct. 25, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612047 [https://perma.cc/C8N6-K9DB]. 
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respected. Additional features linked to the likelihood of dividend 
distribution, such as dividend payout ratio, cash flow, return on assets 
(ROA), and annual profit, were also considered. 
One would expect a positive impact on the distribution of dividends 
as a form of protection of shareholders’ interests, especially those of 
minority shareholders. This would be verified if the dummy variables 
relating to independent directors taken from the list submitted by the 
majority or minority shareholders have positive coefficients. 133  The 
analysis therefore requires a preliminary verification of the presence of 
independent directors (and of minority-appointed directors) on the boards 
in the sample. 
While the degree of independence of Italian directors has clearly 
increased over time since 2010, the number of directors chosen from the 
lists presented by minority shareholders increased in the period between 
2006 and 2009, and then declined slightly until 2011 (Figure 1), 
confirming the data reported by CONSOB. 134  Probably, during the 
financial crisis, the significant costs of disclosing the lists led to the 
conclusion that the mechanism was unnecessary and inefficient. 
                                                                                                                                         
 133. As to the former, the dummy variable is 1, if independent directors are more than 
a third of the entire board, and as to the latter, the dummy variable is 1, if independent 
minority-appointed directors are at least 15% of the board. 
 134. See CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 27-28. For the 
benefit of readers less familiar with Italian company law, it is worth highlighting that 
corporate bodies are generally appointed for a term of three years, but a company’s 
bylaws can vary during this term. Codice di Autodisciplina [Corporate Governance Code] 
Luglio 2015, art. 5, Jul. 2015, (It.). The members of the corporate body may be re-elected, 
unless otherwise provided for in the bylaws. Id. Thus, staggered boards are extremely 
rare in listed companies. 
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Fig. 1 Degree of independence of minority-appointed directors 
in Italian boards over time. 
Interestingly, half of the sample is concentrated in the following 
sectors: banking (250 observations, 19.84%), construction and materials 
(119 observations, 9.44%), and automotive and electronic or electrical 
components (73 observations each, 11.58%).135 
The distribution of observations seems constant during the period 
under consideration. In the aftermath of the introduction of the list voting 
technique, observations are as expected, albeit slightly lower.136 
As to the variables, it is worth reinforcing the relevance of the 
average dividend payout ratio (0.02) (see also, the dividend payout 
variable), and its median (0.01).137 More than half of the companies in the 
sample (59%) have a significant number of independent directors (at least 
one-third of the board), while 13% of them have at least 15% of minority 
directors. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, also known as the linear 
correlation coefficient, is also particularly significant in assessing the 
relationship between the distribution of dividends and (1) independent 
directors (= 1, if more than one third of the directors are independent); (2) 
minority-appointed independent directors (= 1, if the independent 
minority-appointed directors are more than 15%); (3) cash flow deriving 
                                                                                                                                          
 135. See infra Appendix – Table 1. 
 136. See infra Appendix – Table 2. 
 137. See infra Appendix – Table 3. 
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from operations over total assets; (4) CEO duality (= 1, if the CEO is also 
the Chairman of the board at the time of the payment of the dividend 
payout); (5) ROA (average annual return on total assets calculated as net 
income on total assets); (6) negative earnings (= 1, if earnings are 
negative).138 A positive correlation exists in connection to independent 
minority directors, cash flow, and ROA, while a negative one exists in 
connection to the presence of independent directors, CEO duality, and 
negative earnings. Therefore, not only is the distribution of dividends 
more efficient with independent directors, but it is even more efficient 
with minority-appointed independent directors. This is neither obvious 
nor intuitive, but relevant. Finally, correlation with the financial variables 
is in line with the initial assumptions. Additionally, regarding the CEO 
duality (i.e. that it is negatively linked to dividends), the research once 
more suggests that the same person should not be both the CEO and the 
Chairperson.139 
The tables below show the results of the regression, obtained by 
investigating the effect of independent directors and independent minority 
directors (Table 1) on the number of dividends paid. As anticipated, the 
two models (Column 1 and 2) differ in their assessment of industrial 
sectors and time period, the effects of which are only considered in 
Column 2. 
Reading the coefficients of the regression model, it is clear that a 
high percentage of independent directors does not increase the value of 
dividends, even when taking into account the industrial segment and the 
period of time under examination. As to the effect of the independent 
minority directors, since results are meaningful when the level of trust or 
confidence is 95%, a large presence of minority directors does have a 
positive impact on dividend distribution, and, thus, on all shareholders. 
Then, the regression also known as logit regression (Table 2) verifies 
whether the presence of independent minority directors increases the 
likelihood of distributing dividends, in terms of amount and frequency, 
with a dummy variable (= 1) if the dividend is paid. In particular, the 
coefficient is specified in Column 1, while the probability is specified in 
Column 2. The dummy variable relating to independent minority-
appointed directors shows a remarkable positive correlation between the 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. See infra Appendix – Table 4. 
 139. See Yarram & Dollery, supra note 115, at 268-69, 272 (distinguishing the 
empirical impact of CEO duality according to the stewardship theory and the agency 
theory). 
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probability of payment of dividends and independent minority-appointed 
directors in the boardroom. 
The robust findings are also evaluated in light of the ownership 
structure through the examination of the “close” variable (the percentage 
of shares held by large investors in the year of the event).  In the absence 
of a precise value of the variable above, its mean was calculated over the 
2005-2015 time period, so that the average concentration value was 
determined for each company, and the value assumed by the central 
statistical unit was compared to distribution, thus computing the median. 
After estimating the median of the value assumed by the central 
statistical units compared to distribution (55.64%), the impact of the 
presence of independent minority directors above and below this 
threshold was analyzed. The positive effect, assessed in relation to the 
fact that they distribute more dividends to minorities, appears more 
evident in concentrated ownership, while it is less significant, although 
still positive, in widespread ownership structures. 140  All of this data 
suggests that list voting makes more sense in the former environment, but 
list voting is an indicator–although, not necessarily the best–of agency 
costs. When looking at agency costs in both a dispersed ownership system 
and a concentrated ownership system, it is evident that, as to the former, 
(1) managers retain liquidity, (2) the actual conflict is between managers 
and owners, and (3) dividend payouts are really important because paying 
out more dividends means less cash for managers to divert. As to the 
latter, (1) owners force the company into party transactions to strip capital 
from minority owners, (2) the real conflict regards majority versus 
minority owners, and (3) dividend payouts matter less than related-party 
transactions. 
Other relevant legitimate factors must be considered as well, namely: 
(1) the frequency of M&A activities, (2) leverage, and (3) the amount of 
Research and Development (R&D) and Sales. The results are not 
statistically significant, although the regression confirms that all 
outcomes are slightly positive in widespread ownership structures. 
                                                                                                                                         
 140. Accounting for fixed effects would sensibly decrease the degrees of freedom to 
estimate the regression. In other words, it would (negatively) impact the degrees of 
freedom, thus impacting the difference between the number of observations and the 
number of variables in the model. Including firm fixed effects would certainly be 
preferable for a larger number of companies, but it would not be suitable in the case at 
hand. 
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As far as M&A activities are concerned, the outcome corroborates 
the findings of a recent U.S. study, which references 1,596 acquisitions 
between 2009 and 2013, and assesses how board independence, but also 
CEO duality and CEO compensation, positively influence the 
performance of mergers and acquisitions.141 
As to the R&D activity, the result is certainly in line with the agency 
and resource dependence theories, which already predict a positive 
influence of the “independent director ratio on the financial slack-R&D 
investment relationship.”142 Recent literature confirms the existence of a 
noticeable effect of sound governance, implicating independent 
administrators with regard to investment in innovation and innovation 
productivity. This effect can be attributed to a “quasi-natural experiment” 
on a sample of over 10,000 observations related to U.S. listed companies 
from 1996 to 2009, which included the shock effect of Sarbanes-Oxley.143 
R&D/Sales activities are also consistently used as proxies in the literature. 
Companies that heavily invest in development and innovation benefit 
most from the presence of a staggered board.144 Additionally, the changes 
in governance arrangements are considerably more linked to changes in 
value for companies with a large customer. 145  With regard to a 
geographically different area (in this case, Taiwan), the idea that 
                                                                                                                                         
 141. Emanuele Teti, Alberto Dell’Acqua, Leonardo Etro & Michele Volpe, The 
Impact of Board Independency, CEO Duality and CEO Fixed Compensation on M&A 
Performance, 17 CORP. GOV: INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 947, 947 (2017). 
 142. A. S. Ashwin, Rishikesha T. Krishnan & Rejie George, Board Characteristics, 
Financial Slack and R&D Investments, 46 INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 8, 8 (2016). 
 143. Pornsit Jiraporn, Sang Mook Lee, Kuen Jae Park & HakJoon Song, How Do 
Independent Directors Influence Innovation Productivity? A Quasi-Natural Experiment, 
25 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 435 (2018); see also Donald E. Bowen III, Were Non-
Independent Boards Really Captured Before SOX? 4 (July 3, 2017) (on file with author) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2979598 [https://perma.cc/GSL2-
VMX4] (“greater monitoring should discourage acquisitions with agency conflicts and 
opaque R&D, while reduced firm-specific knowledge makes it harder for the board to 
evaluate intangible and risky investments like R&D”). 
 144. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 128 (2016). 
 145. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and 
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 781-82 (2016) 
(defining Large Customer as “at least on customer accounting for 10% or more of [the 
company’s] sales”). On the determinants of R&D, see Edwin Mansfield, R&D and 
Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 127, 128-
29 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984). 
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independent choices can affect managerial decisions is confirmed: “firms 
competing on innovation through R&D investment may consider giving 
considerable weight to the nomination of more independent directors to 
the board.”146 
 
Table 1: Effect on the distribution of dividends of the independent 
directors taken from the list submitted by majority shareholders 
compared to the list presented by minority shareholders. 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT (on annual sales) 
DUMMY_ 
INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS 
-0.08* -0.008** 0.026** 0.018* 
 (-1.86) (-2.29) (2.07) (1.80) 
CASH FLOW 
(OPERATIONS 
OVER TOTAL 
ASSETS) 
0.033 0.059*** 0.022 0.053*** 
 (1.59) (3.32) (1.24) (3.01) 
ROA 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.86) (3.31) (2.94) (3.16) 
CEO DUALITY -0.011*** -0.006 -0.008** -0.004 
 (-2.72) (-1.57) (-2.09) (-1.10) 
NEGATIVE 
EARNINGS -0.019*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.011*** 
 (-4.69) (-3.77) (-4.47) (-3.81) 
INDUSTRY 
FIXED EFFECTS NO YES NO YES 
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS NO YES NO YES 
CONSTANT 0.036*** 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.042*** 
 (6.11) (8.08) (5.74) (6.97) 
Observations 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,260 
R-squared 0.1416 0.2987 0.1798 0.3047 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. Hsiang-Lan Chen, CEO Tenure, Independent Directors and Corporate 
Innovation, 3 J. APPLIED FIN. & BANK. 187, 187 (2013). 
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Adj. R-squared 0.1382 0.2715 0.1766 0.2778 
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level. 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2: Results of the logit regression, considering the effect of 
independent directors taken from the minority shareholders’ list. 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) 
DEP. VAR._DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
DUMMY_ 
MINORITY_ 
INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS 
1.135*** 0.239*** 
 (2.86) (2.89) 
CASH FLOW 
(OPERATIONS OVER 
TOTAL ASSETS) 
4.126* 0.867* 
 (1.79) (1.79) 
ROA 0.157*** 0.033*** 
 (3.93) (3.85) 
CEO DUALITY -0.749*** -0.157*** 
 (-2.87) (-2.90) 
NEGATIVE 
EARNINGS -2.262*** -0.475*** 
 (-7.94) (-7.83) 
INDUSTRY YES YES 
YEAR YES YES 
CONSTANT 16.014*** 
 (19.93) 
Observations 1,190 1,190 
Pseudo r-squared 0.4227 
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level. 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Ownership effect—concentrated versus widespread ownership 
structures. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) PAY OUT PAY OUT PAY OUT PAY OUT 
 Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
LOT_INDEP -0.003 -0.004  
 (-0.94) (-1.56)  
LOT_MIN_INDEP 0.024** 0.022*** 
 (2.29) (2.79) 
CFO_TA 0.021 0.050*** 0.016 0.041** 
 (0.96) (2.63) (0.79) (2.22) 
ROA 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.83) (3.17) (3.36) (2.95) 
CEO_PRESIDENT -0.008* -0.007* -0.006 -0.006* 
 (-1.90) (-1.86) (-1.43) (-1.70) 
LOSS -0.014*** -0.009** -0.012*** -0.008** 
 (-3.06) (-2.10) (-2.61) (-2.28) 
NUMBER_M&A -0.000 
 (-0.42) 
LEVERAGE -0.013 
 (-0.69) 
R&D -0.047 
 (-1.30) 
CONSTANT 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.023*** 0.048*** 
 (6.91) (10.43) (4.97) (11.44) 
  
INDUSTRY & 
YEAR F.E NO YES NO YES 
Observations 690 690 690 690 
Adj. R-squared 14.4% 30.3% 18.9% 33.3% 
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level. 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.  
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) PAY OUT PAY OUT PAY OUT PAY OUT 
 Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
LOT_INDEP -0.015* -0.011**  
 (-1.88) (-2.30)  
LOT_MIN_IN
DEP 
  0.027 0.011 
 (1.59) (0.97) 
CFO_TA 0.058 0.063 0.034 0.030 
 (1.28) (1.52) (1.00) (1.25) 
ROA 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.001 
 (1.66) (1.26) (1.87) (1.61) 
CEO_PRESID
ENT -0.016*** -0.002 -0.011** 0.003 
 (-2.69) (-0.46) (-2.18) (0.83) 
LOSS -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.018*** 
 (-4.87) (-3.86) (-4.87) (-4.06) 
NUMBER_M
&A 
   0.001 
 (0.735) 
LEVERAGE 0.045* 
 (1.80) 
R&D 0.000 
 (0.08) 
  
CONSTANT 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.014 
 (4.60) (5.77) (4.92) (1.53) 
  
INDUSTRY 
& YEAR F.E NO YES NO YES 
  
Observations 570 570 570 570 
Adj. R-
squared 15.0% 32.3% 17.4% 33.3% 
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level. 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
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F. LIST VOTING’S EMPIRICAL LESSON 
In light of the literature reviewed above, this research investigates 
the impact of independent and minority-appointed directors on the 
distribution of dividends. Among the 273 Italian listed corporations in the 
period spanning from 2005 to 2015, there were 2,442 directors, 147 
including those elected from a minority list, who then moved to the 
majority side, or vice versa.148 
Overall, the findings partly confirm the starting assumptions. 
Contrary to what was predicted, the observations indicate that a 
significant number of independent directors in the boardroom (at least 
one-third of them) may reduce the dividend payout ratio, suggesting a 
negative impact on equity profitability. The study reaffirms the value of 
independent minority-appointed directors that, if equal to at least 15% of 
the board, affect dividend policies.149 
At first glance, readers may be inclined to believe that there is no 
need for EI Directors, given the little differences among directors.150 On 
closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that independent minority 
directors can exert influence on dividend payments and increase the 
likelihood of their distributions. The amount, as well as the probability of 
their distribution, increases in presence of independent minority-
appointed directors, suggesting that data would answer the initial question 
positively. This effect is not limited to closely-held ownership structures, 
even if it makes more sense in that context.151 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Among them, 372 have been elected by minority shareholders and 2,070 by 
majority shareholders. 
 148. Without counting these shifts, the total amount of directors would have been 
2,311 board members. 
 149. Results are in line with Hu and Kumar, supra note 112, at 773 (finding that board 
independence increases the dividend payout only if it exceeds 40%). 
 150. Directors appointed by majority shareholders are 57.6 years old (median = 57, 
min = 26.5, max = 91) and are part of 1.25 boards on average (median = 1, min = 1, max 
= 5), whereas directors appointed by minority shareholders are 57.42 years old (median 
= 58, min = 26.5, max = 81) and are part of 1.25 boards on average (median =1, min = 1, 
max = 3). The former presents slightly more women (19% v. 14%). The latter are 
normally paid a little bit more, which is 61.654 € per year on average (median 45.084, 
min = 0, max 160.000) versus 58.117 € per year on average (median = 33.789, min = 0, 
max 180.000). 
 151. Cf. Maribel Sáez & María Gutiérrez, Dividend Policy with Controlling 
Shareholders, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 127–29 (2015). 
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While board characteristics have no influence on the decision to pay 
dividends, they have a significant influence on their magnitude. 
Directors’ independence, and the subsequent enhancement of effective 
board functioning, matters because it permits them to (1) continuously 
and effectively monitor corporate performances, requiring from them a 
remarkable time commitment and implying a limit on the number of board 
seats held; (2) cater to the needs of different investor groups; (3) 
determine the best interest of firms to pay dividends, signaling bright 
prospects when firms have promising projects in the pipeline; and (4) 
encourage firms to pay dividends when they are saddled with high free 
cash flow levels. As a result, it would seem that they are more willing to 
pay higher dividends, encouraging companies to raise money for future 
plans through capital markets. Minority-appointed directors can 
complement the role of dividends in the governance of a corporation, 
prevent managers from gaining personal benefit, and, at the same time, 
build their reputation by paying high dividends. 
Interpreting these results, corporate players may come to conclusions 
we can offer from profiling the playing patterns of the most empirically 
effective contestants in the dividend distribution competition. Investors 
may finance firms that pay higher dividends and have more independent 
boards as a way to reduce agency cost. Corporations, therefore, may opt 
for paying higher dividends and increasing the number of independent 
directors in the boardroom to show their quality to the market. The results 
could also lead policy makers and regulators to require boards comprised 
of EI Directors and recommend that they pursue efficient policies, 
encouraging investments and economic growth. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, both de iure condito and de lege ferenda, we may 
paraphrase an expression used by the colonists just before the American 
Revolution: no participation without representation. Of course, 
corporations’ problems cannot be resolved completely by appointing 
board members taken from the minority lists–that therefore cannot be 
described as a real panacea. Even if the differences among independent 
directors taken from the list submitted by the majority or the minority of 
shareholders are not that sharp in terms of age, remuneration, gender, or 
education, we can, looking at the results, undoubtedly state that list voting 
could travel and be effective even beyond Italian borders. This would lead 
to positive results in terms of dividend payments. 
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Nevertheless, there is a need to determine clear and unambiguous 
rules of play which frame the presentation of slates. The regulation needs 
to be improved, leading to systematic reflections, and to an open and 
constant dialogue, as demonstrated by the “Enriques-Zingales v. 
Marchetti-Ventoruzzo” debate. 152 On the one hand, scholars suggest that 
a binding re-deliberation of legislation would not only eliminate certain 
provisions, such as the inefficient double definition of independence, but 
also correct legislative aporias.153 On the other hand, empirical evidence 
reinforces the belief that a large number of independent directors could 
only be beneficial to the corporation. 
In order to evaluate whether the Italian technique can really “travel,” 
it would be crucial to also study the findings in the context of widely-held 
corporations in the United States, subject to a caveat. We should caution 
against drawing “overly strong conclusions from comparative data 
alone.”154  The Italian example preserves its uniqueness, at least with 
regard to the technical solution it offers, although the U.S. system is 
apparently capable of aligning itself without difficulty with the Italian 
approach, which is mindful towards institutional investors, with the 
concrete involvement of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). The 
CII, founded in 1985 with the goal of empowering institutional investors 
use their proxy power to hold public companies accountable, may play a 
similar role to that of Assogestioni.155 Like the Assogestioni, the CII is a 
non-profit association that promotes the interests of institutional investors 
in the United States and aimed to educate its members, policy makers, and 
the public on corporate governance, shareholder rights, and related 
                                                                                                                                         
 152. See generally Enriques & Zingales, supra note 60; Piergaetano Marchetti & 
Marco Ventoruzzo, Ecco come si può rafforzare il voto di lista, IL SOLE 24 ORE 1186 
(2015) (It.). 
 153. Maria S. Richter Jr., Appunti Sulla Evoluzione della Disciplina 
dell’Amministrazione delle Società Quotate e Sulle sue Prospettive di Riforma’, in ATTI 
DEI SEMINARI CELEBRATIVI PER I 40 ANNI DALL’ISTITUZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE 
NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA BORSA, 69, 75-76 (G. Mollo ed., 2015) (It.). 
 154. Holger Spamann, Empirical Comparative Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
131, 148 (2015). 
 155. About Us-History, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2018), https://www. 
cii.org/cii_history [https://perma.cc/8R9A-SPGN]. 
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investment issues.  By 2015, the CII already supported proxy access in 
the United States.156 
There is a need for EI Directors. It seems appropriate to call for an 
increase in the number of independent directors, particularly in the case 
of (although undesirable) larger boards, where the applicable legal 
provisions do not appear to be sufficiently protective. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 156. Council of Institutional Investors, Proxy Access: Best Practices 2 (2015), 
http://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/08_05_15_Best%20Practices%20-%20Proxy 
%20Access.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KY7-XFC2] (describing proxy access as “a 
fundamental right of long-term shareowners.”). 
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Table A.1: Distribution of the sampled companies (industry). 
 
 Obs. % 
Aerospace & Defense 11 0.87 
Automobiles & Parts 73 5.79 
Banks 250 19.84 
Beverages 12 0.95 
Chemicals 21 1.67 
Construction & Materials 119 9.44 
Electricity 65 5.16 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 73 5.79 
Financial Services (Sector) 64 5.08 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 20 1.59 
Food & Drug Retailers 15 1.19 
Food Producers 43 3.41 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 53 4.21 
General Industrials 39 3.1 
General Retailers 35 2.78 
Health Care Equipment & Services 17 1.35 
Household Goods & Home Construction 60 4.76 
Industrial Engineering 55 4.37 
Industrial Metals & Mining 8 0.63 
Industrial Transportation 10 0.79 
Leisure Goods 8 0.63 
Media 28 2.22 
Mobile Telecommunications 10 0.79 
Nonlife Insurance 1 0.08 
Oil & Gas Producers 3 0.24 
Oil Equipment & Services 7 0.56 
Personal Goods 44 3.49 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 13 1.03 
Real Estate Investment & Services 7 0.56 
Software & Computer Services 47 3.73 
Support Services 20 1.59 
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Technology Hardware & Equipment 20 1.59 
Travel & Leisure 9 0.71 
Total 1.260 100 
 
 
Table A.2: Distribution of observations in the period 2005-2015 
 
Year Obs. % 
2005 100 7.94 
2006 102 8.1 
2007 113 8.97 
2008 108 8.57 
2009 107 8.49 
2010 115 9.13 
2011 110 8.73 
2012 130 10.32 
2013 135 10.71 
2014 125 9.92 
2015 115 9.13 
Total 1.260 100 
 
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95 
DIVIDEND 
PAYOUT 
(on annual sales) 
0.02 0.04 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.09 
DUMMY_ 
INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS 
0.59 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
DUMMY_MIN
ORITY_ 
INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS 
0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 
CASH FLOW 
(operations over 
total assets) 
0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.14 
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ROA 1.75 6.18 -8.58 0.3 1.62 4.55 11.07 
CEO DUALITY 
NEGATIVE 
EARNINGS 
0.41 
0.28 
0.49 
0.45
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
# Obs = 1260   
 
Table A.4: Pearson correlation coefficient 
 
 
DIVIDEN
D 
PAYOUT 
(on annual 
sales) 
INDEP 
DIRECTO
RS 
MINORITY
_INDEP 
DIRECTO
RS 
CASH 
FLOW 
(over total 
assets) 
ROA 
CEO 
DUALITY 
NEGATIV
E 
EARNIN
GS 
DIVIDEND 
PAYOUT 
(on annual 
sales) 
1       
DUMMY _ 
INDEP 
DIRECTORS
-0.1158*** 1      
DUMMY_M
INORITY_I
NDEP 
DIRECTORS
0.263*** 0.0182 1     
CASH 
FLOW 
(over total 
assets) 
0.1797*** -0.0259 0.0545** 1    
ROA 0.2684*** -0.0838*** 0.0285 0.5694*** 1   
CEO 
DUALITY 
-0.1581*** -0.0726*** -0.1718*** 0.0562* 0.0249 1  
NEGATIVE 
EARNINGS 
-0.3255*** 0.0861*** -0.0869*** -0.3467*** -0.6194*** 0.1213*** 1 
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level. 
